Abstract. In this work we present an analysis of a spatially non homogeneous ultimatum game. By considering different underlying topologies as substrates on top of which the game takes place we obtain nontrivial behaviors for the evolution of the strategies of the players. We analyze separately the effect of the size of the neighborhood and the spatial structure. Whereas this last effect is the most significant one, we show that even for disordered networks and provided the neighborhood of each site is small, the results can be significantly different from those obtained in the case of fully connected networks.
Introduction
In the last years, Game Theory has been recognized as a powerful alternative way of examining economics [1, 2] . The models analyzed under this scheme consist of sets of agents that play a certain game and a set of the strategies that can be used by the agents. Game theory can be understood as a mathematical tool for analyzing and predicting human behavior in strategic situations. In the last years many physicists have directed their attention towards the analysis of several market games [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] The equilibrium analysis assumes that all the players display strategic thinking and optimizing behavior. However, it is widely accepted, and has been experimentally shown, that not every player behaves in a rational way. The realization of this difference led to the creation of Behavioral Economics, a branch of economics closely related to the study of the behavior of economical agents rather than economical quantities [9, 10] . One of the most interesting results obtained in this field is the observation that real individuals do not behave according to the classical assumptions of homo economicus [11] , a completely rational individual who seeks to optimize his utilities with the least possible cost.
The gap between economics and Game Theory has been bridged by Evolutionary Game Theory, which takes into account the possibility that the strategies of the agents can change following some evolutionary rule. Evolutionary Game Theory has succeeded in explaining a e-mail: kuperman@cab.cnea.gov.ar how cooperation can arise in populations playing noncooperative games, i.e. in games where cooperation is possible but is not favored. Included in the group of noncooperative games with economical interest we find the Prisoner's Dilemma, the Ultimatum Game, bargaining games, etc.
In the present work we focus on some aspects related to the Ultimatum Game. The essential features of this game can be very easily summarized. Two individuals are told that they have the opportunity to split a given amount of externally provided money. One of the individuals is randomly chosen as the first player and to assume the role of the offerer. He/she has to make a one time offer, consisting of indicating how much of the total amount of money is to be given to each player. The other player, as the respondent, has the opportunity to either accept or reject this offer. If the offer is rejected both get nothing. If the offer is accepted, each one gets the accorded part. Both participants are aware of the rules of the game before making any decision.
The Ultimatum Game is a particular case of bargaining. Game theory predicts that the best strategy is to offer an unequal split favoring the offerer. In [12] it is shown that if ε is the lowest allowed partition and given that a rational responder will prefer a small amount to nothing, the best strategy for the offerer is to give just ε and take the rest. But studies made by behavioral economists have shown that most of the time real individuals tend to reject unequal offers. The first studies are described in [13] . Since then there have been extensive studies on the behaviors 234 The European Physical Journal B of the players under different circumstances and within a wide spectra of cultural environments. Their results do not lead to a unique behavioral profile, and in particular they show clearly that human players usually do not act as the homo economicus [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] .
It has also been shown [21] that inequity aversion may not be a exclusively human feature: brown capuchin monkeys (Cebus Capella) seem to respond negatively to unequal reward distribution in exchanges with a human experimenter.
In order to explore the ultimatum game beyond the "static" formulation by Rubinstein [12] , some authors have analyzed the evolutionary ultimatum game [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] . In these works it is shown that when the agents are placed in an ordered network (and therefore constrained to play with, and imitate, only their neighbors) the evolution takes the system to more equitable strategies than predicted by the rational players hypothesis. One natural question that arises is whether this effect is only due to the spatial distribution of the players or it is also due to the fact that the players are restricted to play and imitate only a very small number of agents.
One of the goals of this work is to stress the important role played by the underlying topology. Notice that ordered networks differ from the fully mixed case not only in that agents are connected to a very small set of other agents, but also in the fact that the clustering is much smaller, i.e. the neighbors of a site are not necessarily connected among themselves. In this work we analyze these features separately to understand the effect they have on the evolution of strategies.
We show that some field results can be in correspondence with our findings. For example, in [16] it is shown that the behavior of players cannot be unequivocally associated either with the rational or the altruistic attitudes. On the contrary, experiments across different cultural environments show that it is spread over a wide spectra of possibilities. This result was mentioned but not discussed in previous works. At the same time we establish interesting relationships between the outcome of an evolutionary situation and the underlying social topology.
The model
The model consists of a set of N players located on a network, which defines the neighborhood of each player, i.e. the subset of the whole population that is available for interaction. Each player i is assigned a playing strategy that consists of a pair of real numbers (o i , a i ) within the interval [0, 1] . An interaction consists in taking a pair of linked players, and let them play twice, alternating the roles of offerer and respondent. o i is the offer of player i when acting as offerer, and a i is the smallest amount i accepts when acting as respondent. The total sum allotted in each game is 1.
The temporal evolution of the game is organized into generations. In each generation, each player interacts with all of its neighbors. The payoff of i when playing with j, w ij is
After each agent has played with its entire neighborhood we compute the cumulative payoff of each individual and consider that a game generation has concluded. It is at this moment that the evolutionary dynamics takes place.
In the next generation all the players are replaced by their offspring. The strategy of a site is updated by choosing one strategy in the neighborhood (including the site to be updated) with probability equal to the ratio between the individual cumulative payoff and the total cumulative payoff of all the sites in the neighborhood. This warrants a competition process in which only the fittest or more successful strategies survive. In the next generation, a new breed of players occupies the sites of the network, with reset payoffs but with strategies determined by the outcome of the previous generation. The fact that a strategy was successful in a given generation does not guarantee its success in the next one, with a different distribution of strategies.
To avoid the system to get stuck in spurious local minima, we add some noise in the form of small mutations, associated to a mutation rate [23] . In this work we maintain = 10 −3 . Once the process of reproduction is finished by determining which player will leave its offspring in which sites, the descendants copy their ancestor strategy with a small variation: if the individual that formerly occupied the site m leaves a descendant in the place l, the strategy of the new occupant of the site l is then
with δ ∈ [− , ] a real random number. We have performed simulations in three different topologies: ordered, disordered, and k-Small World Networks (k-SWN), to interpolate smoothly between the ordered and disordered topologies. The ordered topology consists of nodes on a ring, joined to their first k neighbors to each side. In this work we take k > 1. These networks are highly clustered: many neighbors of each node are connected among themselves, forming triangles. This characteristic is quantified by the clustering coefficient which is the number of triangles centered on each node divided by the number of pairs of neighbors, averaged over all the nodes. The disordered topology we consider is a random graph where all the nodes have the same degree 2k (also called regular random graphs). The third topology is a variation of the small world networks of Watts & Strogatz (WS) [27] .
The algorithm of construction of WS networks is as follows: starting from an ordered network, the ring is traversed and with probability p each link is rewired to a random node. Double and self links are not allowed. Though the algorithm conserves the total number of links, at the
